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This paper uses previously unavailable historical records to show that several as-
sumptions central to a learning by doing explanation of productivity growth in the
construction of Liberty ships during World War II are mistaken. Impressive in-
creases in output per worker recorded at one of the largest shipyards in the program,
Calship, are shown to be strongly associated with increases in capital intensity and
with a reduction in quality, where the latter is measured by the probability of a ship
developing serious fractures that threatened the lives of its crew. Capital deepening
and quality change, in conjunction with changes in production technologies and ca-
pacity utilization, account for virtually all the increase in labor productivity.
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for productivity to rise with cumulative output, particularly at early stages of
production.
1 To engineers and managers, this phenomenon is known as the
learning or start-up curve, but to economists it is best known as learning by do-
ing. There is, of course, an implicit judgment in this choice of terminology that
a causal relationship has been found to exist; that producers learn from experi-
ence and that cumulative production is a good measure of experience. Learning
has been formally modeled in a variety of settings, and has been shown to have
important consequences for market structure, development, and the appropri-
ate design of policy.
2 Economists have, however, had no more success than psy-
chologists in explaining how agents learn, and theoretical work on learning has
largely been limited to analyzing the consequences of simply assuming its
presence.
However, numerous difficulties involved in measuring the sources of pro-
ductivity growth raise the possibility that much of what has been attributed to
learning by doing in empirical studies may just be measurement error. Rosen-
berg (1976, p.329) has suggested that "cost reductions which have been attrib-
uted to learning by doing [may] have actually been due to other factors which
have not been correctly identified, especially in cases where learning by doing
has been defined as a residual." Moreover, measurement problems seem to be
particularly severe in the relatively small number of classic historical studies
that are regularly cited to motivate theory.
3 For example, Arrow, Arrow and
Bradley (1951) and Asher (1956) have argued that the data available on World
War II airframe production are too aggregated and unreliable to allow one to
draw reliable conclusions about the importance of learning by doing. More
1 The list is far too large to merit selective citation here. See Dutton and Thomas
(1984) and Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) for numerous examples.
2 Again, the list is long; but among the best known are Arrow (1962), Fudenberg
and Tirole (1983), Krugman (1987), Lucas (1993), and Spence (1981).
3 I have particularly in mind the studies by Wright (1936) on interwar aircraft
production, by Alchian (1950) on WWII airframe production, and by Rapping (1965)
on WWII merchant ship construction.
- 1 -recently, Bell and Scott-Kemmis (1990) have mustered a variety of qualitative
evidence to suggest that productivity growth in the wartime airframe and ship-
building industries was due to numerous factors other than on-the-job learning.
4
But despite these doubts about the reliability of evidence drawn from war-
time production experiences, there has been no attempt to show that factors
other than learning can account quantitatively for the considerable productivity
growth rates observed during the war. This study uses previously unavailable,
and highly disaggregated, data to evaluate the reliability of conventional wis-
dom on the importance of learning by doing in the Liberty shipbuilding pro-
gram of World War II. The paper suggests that, in this case at least, concerns
about the reliability of existing evidence on learning are well founded.
The paper has two parts. The first examines three assumptions, critical to
the case for a learning explanation of productivity growth in the Liberty pro-
gram, and presents evidence that these assumptions are incorrect. First, capital
deepening is shown to be much more important than has been assumed, and
this alone can account for a substantial fraction of the observed increases in out-
put per worker. This finding can also explain the powerful productivity-
enhancing role that has been attributed to cumulative output. It turns out that
cumulative output is an excellent proxy for the capital stock.
 Second, the assumption that all ships were the same is not correct. Poor su-
pervision and defective welding motivated by incentive payments for fast work
resulted in over ten percent of the Liberty fleet fracturing, some disastrously so.
Indeed, productivity is an excellent predictor of the probability that a Liberty
ship developed fractures. Third, the assumption of constant technology is easily
refuted. Construction of the first ships was well under way before the shipyards
themselves had been completed, and the technology with which these ships
were produced was often very different from the mass production techniques
4 In a similar study, Lazonick and Brush (1985) have re-examined evidence on
productivity growth in a 19th-century cotton mill, that David (1973) had earlier
attributed to learning. They concluded that much of the growth attributed to learning
may in fact have been the result of increasing labor effort induced by the exercise of
managerial power over a progressively less organized labor force.
- 2 -used throughout most of the war. The data show that perhaps one half of the
productivity growth observed during the war can be explained by the low pro-
ductivity of labor engaged in production of the first dozen ships or so.
The second part of the paper uses data exclusively from one of the largest
shipyards, Calship, to decompose productivity growth by source. Increases in
the stock of capital, because of time-to-build delays in yard construction and
subsequent capital investment, account for a large majority of the observed in-
creases in labor productivity. But additional sources, including changes in capac-
ity utilization, product quality, and yard employment, also made significant
contributions. Once these various sources of growth are accounted for, there is
almost nothing left to be explained by learning by doing.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 1 reviews conventional wis-
dom on the Liberty ship program. Section 2 describes the Calship data. Section
3 examines capital deepening at Calship, Section 4 establishes a link between
productivity growth and quality reduction, and Section 5 discusses the overlap
of the yard and ship construction programs. Section 6 concludes the paper with
a growth accounting exercise that strongly indicates that learning by doing does
not lie behind the impressive rates of productivity growth observed at Calship.
1. The Liberty Ship Miracle
5
In 1941, the U.S. Maritime Commission (USMC) embarked on a massive
expansion of the merchant marine fleet under the auspices of the Emergency
Shipbuilding Program. The standard Liberty ship, an all-welded cargo ship with
a displacement of 7,000 tons, was the centerpiece of this program. Over a four-
year period, 16 U.S. shipyards delivered a total of 2,580 ships, by far the largest
ever production run of a single ship design.
6 
5 This phrase was coined by Lucas (1993).
6 An additional 119 vessels -- tankers, colliers, and  aircraft and tank transporters --
were also classified as Liberty ships. In addition, a small number of the standard
Liberty cargo ships were converted to hospital ships, troop carriers, or training ships.
- 3 -A revolutionary aspect of the Liberty shipbuilding program was that a sub-
stantial portion of ship construction was undertaken off the ways (the berths in
which the keel is laid and from which the ship is eventually launched). Most
yards had a linear 'conveyor belt' plan. Steel plates and shapes entered a holding
area in the yard on its inland side, and passed through a large prefabrication
area where major sections of the ship were constructed. The sections were then
transported on rails or by moveable cranes to one the ways, and large whirley
cranes lifted them onto the hull for final assembly. Welding constituted the
bulk of this work. A Liberty ship contained almost 600,000 feet of welded
joints, and welding labor accounted for about one third of the direct labor em-
ployed in construction.
7 Once the main structures were completed, the vessel
was launched and moved to the outfitting docks nearby. Another keel was typi-
cally laid on the vacant way within twenty-four hours. There, final painting,
joinery and electrical work were completed, and rigging and lifeboats were
added. The same day that the final outfitting was completed, the ship was deliv-
ered to a representative of the USMC, boarded by its crew, and sent to join one
of hundreds of convoys crossing the Atlantic or the Pacific.
 Output at shipyards is primarily constrained by the number of ways at the
yard, and the length of time that a ship spends on the ways before it can be
launched. Modularization reduced considerably the time ships spent on the
ways, greatly increasing the productive capacity of the yards. The gains in labor
productivity were equally significant, as some tasks could be carried out more
easily in inland work areas. For example, metal plates could be held in positions
that allowed for automatic welding or that made manual welding easier.
The phenomenal increase in labor productivity experienced during the Lib-
erty program, first brought to the profession's attention by Searle (1945), is well
known. Over the course of three years, labor productivity rose at an average an-
nual rate of 40 percent. Moreover, because yards entered the program at
different times, the industry average understates the rate of increase in output
per worker at individual yards.
8 Using data for individual yards, Searle showed
7 Statistics and Reports Unit (1944).
- 4 -that each doubling of cumulative output reduced labor hours per ship by be-
tween 12 and 24 percent.
Rapping (1965) is most closely associated with the learning-by-doing inter-
pretation of productivity growth in the Liberty program. Rapping proposed a
yard-specific production function of the form






where yit is monthly deliveries in deadweight tons, A is a constant, Wit is the
number of ways in operation at time t (his proxy for the stock of capital), Lit is
employment in hours, and Yit=Yit-1+yit-1 is cumulative yard output. Rapping es-
timated the parameters of the production function using pooled data from fif-
teen yards. His analysis confirmed Searle's earlier work. Each doubling of
cumulative output was associated with an increase in output of between 11 and
34 percent (the mean of g over six regressions was 0.23). Moreover, this appar-
ent learning effect was robust to the inclusion of calendar time, which had no
significant impact on productivity.
9  Lucas (1993, pp.259,262) has described the
Liberty ship data as "the best evidence I know of that bears on on-the-job pro-
ductivity change. . . . What is exceptional about the Liberty ship evidence, I
think, is the cleanness of the experiment, not the behavior it documents so
beautifully." 
Much of this paper is concerned with an evaluation of the cleanness of the
experiment. Let me make it clear, however, that this evaluation is not intended
as a criticism of Rapping's pioneering analysis. Rather, the issue is that data
limitations lie behind misleading inferences that have been drawn from esti-
mates of equation (1).
10 Specifically, the evaluation focuses on three important
8 Lane (1951) provides the most detailed graphical summary of productivity growth
at individual yards.
9 Argote, Beckman and Epple (1990) have added labor turnover rates to Rapping's
analysis without undermining his key findings.
10 In fact, Rapping was careful to note the limitations of his data and urged "extreme
caution" in interpreting his regressions. However, his warnings have rarely been
heeded in subsequent citations. 
- 5 -assumptions embedded in these inferences. First, that Wit is a good proxy for
capital; second, that any changes in technology can be captured by a constant
exponential trend; and third, that there are no changes in the quality of ships
over time. This paper provides evidence that none of these assumptions is valid.
2. The Calship Data
This paper uses a new data set for one of the largest shipyards involved in
the Emergency Shipbuilding Program,  the California Shipbuilding Corpora-
tion (Calship) at Terminal Island, Los Angeles. The detailed data for Calship are
supplemented with limited observations currently available for other yards.
The data were constructed from contemporary worksheets, reports and corre-
spondence contained in the Records of the USMC and the Records of the U.S.
Coast Guard at the National Archives. Most data for Calship are disaggregated
at the individual ship level.
11 Labor hours per ship are disaggregated into direct
and indirect labor requirements. The dates of keel laying, launching, delivery,
fractures suffered (if any), and damage due to act of war, are available for each
ship. Employment data are available only monthly, but are disaggregated by
type of employee, shift distribution, and weekend employment.
Figure 1 plots labor requirements and production time at Calship against
the date of keel laying, and illustrates the remarkable reductions in both. Con-
struction of the Calship yard began on 10 January 1941, and the keel of the first
ship was laid on 24 May 1941 while much of the yard was still under construc-
tion. The first ship, John C. Freemont, was delivered 273 days later on 27 Febru-
ary 1942. It took 1.73 million hours of labor, and cost $3.8 million. Over the
next three years, Calship constructed 336 Liberty ships, 306 of them standard
Libertys and 30 of them emergency tankers. The yard was the third largest pro-
ducer of Liberty ships. The last Liberty, Martin Johnson, was delivered on 4
11 Each yard was required to submit invoices detailing expenditures on each ship to
the Maritime Commission every fifteen days. To assist in the accounting process, the
Commission employed resident auditors at the yard. Productivity data are taken from
worksheets constructed from these audited accounts.
- 6 -May 1944. It took 48 days and 474,857 labor hours to build, and cost the Mari-
time Commission $2.7 million. The last ship to be produced did not set produc-
tion records at the yard. In fact the record had been set a year earlier by Finley
Peter Dunne. Delivered on 30 June 1943, it took 406,000 hours of labor and 31
days to build. Calship also delivered 131 other types of ships, primarily Victory
cargoes. But until April 1943, the yard built nothing but standard Libertys.
12 As
Table 1 shows, Calship's experience was typical of the larger yards.
12 Figure 1 also shows two periods of abnormal volatility in productivity at Calship.
The first, late in 1941, will be shown in Section 5 to be caused by variations in
production techniques resulting from the production of ships while the yard itself was
still under construction. The second, in mid-1943, identifies the production dates for
the 30 emergency tankers.
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Figure 1. Productivity at Calship
Sources: Production dates from handwritten tabulations located in Records of the Production Di-
vision, various boxes. Production time from handwritten tabulations by G.J. Fischer, Chief Stat-
istician, located in Records of the Historian's Office, Boxes 30 & 31. Labor requirements are
from unattributed typescript tabulations, located in Records of the Historian's Office, Boxes






























   465





















a  At peak production.
b A publicity stunt produced under exceptional circumstances. The next fastest took 25
days.
Sources: See notes to Figure 1.
3. Capital Deepening
The absence of data on capital has encouraged a perception that none of the
massive increases in productivity at the yard level can be attributed to the famil-
iar mechanism of capital deepening. Rapping (1965) and Argote, Beckman and
Epple (1990) used the number of authorized ways in each yard as a proxy for
the capital stock, a measure that exhibits almost no variation over time for indi-
vidual yards. However data on physical infrastructure at each yard suggest that
the number of ways is indeed a crude proxy. 
Table 2 provides three measures of infrastructure per way for seven large
yards. Crane capacity - the major constraint on the size of prefabricated
- 8 -components - varied from 22 tons to 46 tons per way; expenditures on machin-
ery and equipment varied from $286,000 to $811,000 per way; and the size of
prefabrication areas varied from 14,200 square feet to 66,400 square feet per
way. It is also evident that the four yards with above average productivity had
significantly more infrastructure than the three least productive yards.

















































Source: Fischer (1948, Table 1).
Of course, these differences across yards do not by themselves suggest that
differences in capital per way might account for any of the increase in produc-
tivity over time. However it is evident that not all investment was carried out
at the time the yards were constructed. USMC (1945, p. 4) notes, for example,
- 9 -that no new shipyards were established during the fiscal year July 1943 - June
1944, but $31,142,777 were expended during that period for additional facilities
in existing yards, none of which was used to contruct additional ways.
Figure 2 plots Maritime Commission authorizations for capital investments
at Calship along with cumulative output. On 10 January 1941, the Commission
approved expenditures of $4.8 million to build six ways and supporting produc-
tion facilities, adding on 10 April another eight ways and supporting facilities
for an anticipated cost of $4.3 million. These expenditures account for only one
third of total investment during the program. On 16 January 1942, investments
of $2.8 million were approved for additions to the prefabrication plant and ex-
panded electrical and automatic welding facilities. These expenditures were ap-
proved after nineteen keels had been laid, and five ships had been launched. On
16 June 1942, another $1.9 million was approved to installnew whirley cranes
that would enable the yard to pre-assemble larger components, and to install ad-
ditional welding equipment on ways and pre-assembly platforms. Fifty keels
had already been laid prior to this investment. Additional authorizations, be-
tween May 1941 and January 1943, accounted for a further $8.2 million expan-
sion of capital. Finally, $4.7 million of new capital expenditures were
authorized in April 1943 to facilitate conversion of the yard to production of
the more complex, and heavier, Victory ships.
One might object that some or even all of the incremental investment could
have been the direct result of production experience enabling managers to iden-
tify capital constraints. That is, the effects of learning by doing might just be
embodied in capital.
13 However, the evidence clearly indicates that all major in-
cremental investments were direct and immediate responses to unanticipated in-
creases in the scope of the Emergency Program. Lane (1951, pp.40-71)
13 Indeed, Vice Admiral Vickery, vice-chairman of the USMC, testified to Congress
that additional capital expenditures were often a result of "everybody thinking of
something new they wanted  . . . like the youngster with candy who wants more."
(House of Representatives, 1943, p.912). Lane (1951, p.473), noting possible inter-yard
spillovers on investment decisions, also pointed out that additional capital
expenditures were often suggested by Vickery himself as he "went from yard to yard,
telling each of them what was being done better elsewhere."
- 10 -documents the series of expansions in the scheduled production of Liberty ships
that took place in 1941 and 1942. On 3 January 1941, the U.S. government an-
nounced plans to supply 200 ships to the British under a lend-lease arrange-
ment. Calship won its first contract for 31 ships several weeks later. On 27
March 1941, Congress approved the Defense Aid Supplemental Appropriation
Act, which provided funds to construct an additional 200 ships for the British.
A contract with Calship, dated 17 April 1941, called for an additional 24 ships.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 November 1941 immediately gener-
ated another wave of expansion as the United States entered the war. On 16
January 1942, Calship won a contract for an additional 109 ships. Finally,
- 11 -


























































































































































Notes on major authorizations: 1) Construction of 8 ways and supporting facilities. 2) Con-
struction of additional 6 ways and supporting facilities. 3) Additional buildings for prefabrica-
tion plant, and expanded electrical and automatic welding facilities. 4) Larger capacity cranes on
ways, and additional welding equipment on ways and pre-assembly platforms. 5) Facilities up-
grading, primarily to assist conversion to Victory ship program.
Sources: See notes to Figure 1. Capital authorizations from untitled typescripts, Records of
the Historian's Office, Boxes 32 and 44 (Records of the USMC, National Archives RG178).
Figure 2. Capital Deepening at Calship, 1941-1945unexpected heavy losses to torpedo attacks in the Atlantic during Spring 1942
generated a new round of contracts in June of that year, with Calship contract-
ing for 60 more ships on 16 June 1942. 
These new and unanticipated contracts for ships clearly coincide with the
capital expansions at Calship. But there is also evidence that the former moti-
vated the latter. For example,  J.E. Schmeltzer, a senior member of the USMC
Technical Division, observed that the January 1942 incremental investment in
Calship was necessary "to accelerate the ship construction schedule . . . to cover
the increased scope of the plant and facilities for the purpose of facilitating the
assembly of hulls; all in relation to the augmented and accelerated shipbuilding
program." In June 1942, C.W. Flesher, West Coast regional director for con-
struction, commented that the June 1942 expansions at Calship were necessary
"in order to increase the deliveries of ships to the largest number possible
within the physical limitations of [Calship]."
14
Capital deepening at Calship over the life of the Liberty program was exten-
sive. Although investment decisions did not arise from the gradual identifica-
tion of capital constraints on production,  cumulative output nevertheless turns
out to be an excellent proxy for capital. The correlation between the logarithm
of cumulative capital authorizations and the logarithm of cumulative output at
Calship is 0.91, while the correlation between calendar time and the logarithm
of cumulative capital authorizations is significantly lower, at 0.72.
15 Thus, point
estimates of the coefficient on cumulative output obtained from OLS regres-
sions of a log-linearized version of equation (1) correspond fairly precisely to
14 Both quotes from untitled typescripts containing summaries of USMC minutes,
Schmelzter's dated 18 January 1942 and Flesher's dated 11 June 1942. Records of the
Historian's Office Box 32, Records of the US Maritime Commission (National
Archives, RG178). Almost identical justifications accompany requests for, and
approvals of, additional facilities at Todd-Houston (Vickery, 1943a), Jones-Brunswick
(Vickery, 1943b), and Oregon (Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation, 1942, p.1).
15 The predictive power of cumulative output is likely to extend across yards. Lane
(1951, p.145) points out that when new capital expansions and ship contracts were
being considered, "the Maritime commission turned to the West Coast  . . . because of
its outstanding record." Shipyards were more likely to win additional contracts if they
had already produced ships at an above average rate.
- 12 -the elasticity of output with respect to capital.
16  
This explanation for the apparent robustness of the learning effect mirrors
findings from Sinclair, Klepper and Cohen's (1997) study of the specialty chemi-
cals division of a modern Fortune 500 company. They found that variations in
learning rates across more than one thousand products were largely attributable
to variations in process R&D. Moreover, they established that cumulative out-
put was an excellent predictor for future output and hence for the expected re-
turns to R&D. Products with greater cumulative output were therefore more
likely to be the recipients of R&D effort, and more likely to exhibit cost
reductions. 
4. Fractures in Liberty Ships
Just as the peak productivity levels were being recorded in the winter of
1942-1943, some remarkable hull failures occurred. On 16 January 1943 a Lib-
erty tanker, Schenectady, split in two while moored in calm water at the outfit-
ting dock at Swan Island, Oregon. 
Without warning and with a report which was heard for at least a mile, the
deck and sides of the vessel fractured just aft of the bridge superstructure.
The fracture extended almost instantaneously to the turn of the bilge port
and starboard. The deck side shell, longitudinal bulkhead and bottom girders
fractured. Only the bottom plating held. The vessel jack-knifed and the
center portion rose so that no water entered. The bow and stern settled into
the silt of the river bottom.
US Coast Guard (1944)
The ship was twenty four hours old. 
The Schenectady was not the first Liberty ship to fracture, although it was
certainly one of the more dramatic cases. In fact ten ships, eight of them stan-
dard Libertys, had already suffered a class I fracture by the time of the
16 Estimating equation (1) with the Calship data yields a coefficient of  0.30 on the
logarithm of cumulative output. Replacing cumulative output with cumulative capital
authorizations, the corresponding point estimate is 0.34.
- 13 -Schenectady incident.
17 But it was the first to happen in full view of a city of half
of a million people, and hence the first to attract widespread attention. Portland
newspapers of 17 January 1943 reported the story, and publicity about several
more serious casualties in the months following could not be suppressed.
18 On 2
February 1943, an editorial in The New York Journal of Commerce observed
that
For the last year the Maritime Commission has used the construction
records of the Kaiser yards as a sort of whip with which to goad other of the
nation's yards into speedier construction. No one will deny that speed is
needed in the construction and delivery of ships. However, no matter how
speedily a ship is delivered its worth is practically nil if its plates crack, or if
for any other reason that vessel must spend thirty to sixty days in a repair
yard after one or two trips.
Lane (1951, p.545) reports that there were "other less sensational fractures
during the opening months of 1943." In fact there were many more, and they
were to continue throughout the war.  By June 1946, 103 Liberty vessels had
suffered one or more class I fractures, and another 291 had suffered at least one
class II fracture.
19 By the end of the war, over fifteen percent of the Liberty fleet
had suffered fractures that caused total loss or required extensive and costly re-
pairs. At Calship, 63 of 306 standard Liberty ships eventually produced frac-
tures, nineteen of them class I fractures. 
17 A class I fracture is one which results in either the actual loss of a vessel, or which
has progressed to such an extent into the strength deck or shell as to endanger the
saftey of the vessel. Descriptions of class I fractures are given in Board of Investigation
(1945).
18  Several these casualties also occurred in calm water. On 12 February 1943 Belle
Isle, an ore ship, was traveling partly loaded in calm seas. She split across the deck and
part way down the sides, complete rupture being prevented by rivets on the side
seams. Four days later, the new Liberty ship Henry Wynkoop fractured her deck while
being loaded in New York, and on 29 March the tanker Esso Manhattan broke in two
just after leaving the entrance to New York Harbor. 
19 A class II fracture is one which does not immediately place the vessel in danger,
but which has the potential to develop into a class I fracture. Some vessels fractured as
many as five times, and there were in fact over one thousand fracture incidents.
Fractures known to have occured before 2 February 1946 are taken from Bates (1946)
and Board of Investigation (1945).
- 14 -Following the Schenectady incident, the Maritime Commission established a
Board of Investigation to study the causes of, and provide solutions to, the
problem of fracturing. The Board immediately funded over thirty distinct re-
search projects at laboratories and universities throughout the country.  There
is much talk in the interim reports of the Board of Inquiry
20 of "locked in
stresses" in certain areas of the ship, exacerbated by shifting loads in rough
weather and sudden drops in air or water temperature, and that were "relieved"
by the crackings. But, as Lane (p. 572) notes, such phrases were "figures of
speech used to describe the unknown, just as psychiatrists describe the myster-
ies of human personality by talking about the need of relieving inhibitions."
Despite this uncertainty, the major research effort funded by the Board gener-
ated numerous important design changes between February and April 1943,
which are described in some detail by Lane (1951, pp. 548-550) .
21
While experts were talking about locked in stresses, they were also paying
much attention to the quality of welding.
22 In fact, by the time that Tyler (1947)
surveyed the fracture problem, the problem of welding quality had become a
central theme.
23 Defective welds were associated with expanded use of auto-
matic welding machines in late 1942, which reduced the strength of critical
welds and joints.
24 But C.E. Wilson, Production Vice-Chairman of the War
Production Board, clearly believed as early as March 1943 that poor welding
was due to much more than automation. He visited most of the yards in the
weeks following the Schenectady incident, and documented numerous cases of
poor supervision of welders, poor craftsmanship, and even fraud.
25 
20 Especially in Board of Investigation (1944).
21 Additional modifications were mandated in January and February 1944.
22 In fact, the official Coast Guard report attributes the Schenectady incident to welds
in critical seams that "were found to be defective." 
23 Half of Tyler's report is devoted to the topics of welder training, supervision, and
welding practices.
24 Marine Engineering and Shipping Review (1942) reported that yards were
introducing new automatic welding techniques that increased production by up to 100
percent.
- 15 -Bonus wage payments for fast work led in some instances to intentionally
defective welding and fraudulent actions. In April 1943, Wilson appeared in Bal-
timore as an expert witness in the civil trial of one of nine welders accused of
placing unfused electrodes and slugs of iron in plate grooves and then covering
them with superficial welds. The process, known in welding circles as slugging,
greatly increases the speed of welding but seriously weakens the joint. The de-
fendant was convicted of "making war material in a defective manner with the
intent that his act would hinder, obstruct and interfere with the United States
Government in preparing for and carrying on the war"
26 and, being a minor,
was sentenced to eighteen months in a reformatory school. Wilson found that
some welders at the Bethlehem-Fairfield yard in Baltimore had tried to use two
electrodes with machines designed for only one. At Calship, poorly skilled
welders were found to have substituted test plates made by others, while some
unskilled welders had skilled friends and relatives take qualifying tests for them.
Not all the blame can be laid on the yard employees. In fact, from the
beginning of the program, top administrators in the construction program had
encouraged greater production speed with the full knowledge that reliability
might suffer as a consequence. For example, the American Bureau of Shipping,
the agency reponsible for coordinating safety inspections, issued a statement in
early 1942 that explicitly directed shipyards to favor speed over safety:
It must be recognized, not only by inspectors but also by the building yards,
to whom copies of this letter are being furnished, that under the present
circumstances early completion of serviceable ships is of greater national
importance than the high measure of perfection required for full durability.
27
Tyler (1947, p.18) notes that the letter was discussed without adverse comment
in a meeting of the Production Division of the USMC.
While contemporary documents clearly link the push for rapid production
to the quality of work, little more than anecdotal evidence exists. Table 3
25 Lane (1951, pp.544-573) and Tyler (1947) report several of Wilson's anecdotes.
26 Wilson, quoted in Tyler (1947, p.72).
27 Quoted in Tyler (1947, p.17).
- 16 -provides estimates of the relationship between labor productivity and the prob-
ability of a vessel produced by Calship eventually suffering one or more frac-
tures. The first column reports the results of a probit analysis, while the second
column contains the coefficients of a duration model in which the hazard rate
has a Weibull distribution. The regressions control for the fact that the observa-
tion for each ship is truncated, either by the sampling date of 2 February 1946,
or because the ship's war service was ended at an earlier date due ot war loss.
28
In the probit model an increase in the length of war service is expected to in-
crease the probability of a fracture. The coefficient on a dummy variable to cap-
ture the effect of the design changes imposed on all yards by May 1943 is
expected to be negative in both regressions.
29 All coefficients are significant and
have the expected sign. In particular, a reduction in labor hours expended on
the production of a ship is strongly associated with an increase in the probabil-
ity that it subsequently developed fractures. Moreover, this relationship is ro-
bust to the inclusion of calendar time. The same results hold when production
order (hull number) is also included, when labor hours and the sampling win-
dow enter in logarithms, when total labor hours are used instead of direct labor
hours, and when the binary model is estimated by logit.
Incidentally, Tyler (1947) reports that it was widely believed during the war
that fracture rates were unrelated to the length of time a ship had been in serv-
ice. The point estimate of the parameter v in the duration model is not signifi-
cantly different from one. Thus, the Weibull model cannot be distinguished
from an exponential model with a constant hazard rate, lending formal support
to that belief.
28 Data on war losses are from Economics and Statistics Division (1946) and Sawyer
and Mitchell (1970).
29 As Calship laid only two more Liberty keels after February 1944, no dummy is
used for the second round of mandatory design changes.
- 17 -Table 3. Determinants of Fracture Probabilities and Hazard Rates in Standard Liberty
Ships Produced at Calship
PROBIT  DURATION 
MODEL
WEIBULL
d yi=1 IF FRACTURE REPORTED





DIRECT LABOR HOURS PER SHIP
    (millions)












    (dummy)
-0.70*
(.31)
 -1.29*  
(.54)
DATE OF KEEL LAYING (hundreds
of days since first keel laid) 
-0.18   
  (.14) 
 -0.48* 
(.24)










Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 5% level.  ** Significant at 1%
level. 
a  Years from delivery to end of sampling period on 2 Feb 1946 or war loss, whichever comes
first.
b  Dummy variable: 0 if keel laying before May 1943, otherwise 1.
c  The 30 tankers are excluded.
d  The hazard function of the Weibull model is li(t)=liv(lit)
v-1, where li=exp(b
/xi) and xi is a
vector of the regressors. The log-likelihood function is
, lnL = S
i
[di(v(lnsi + b xi) + lnv) - exp(v(lnsi + b xi))]
where di=1 if the vessel developed fractures, and di=0 otherwise; si is the time (in years)
between delivery and whichever comes first among fracture date, war loss and end of sampling
period. See Green (1993, pp. 716-722).
e  Not significantly different from 1.
- 18 -Figure 2 plots the predicted probabilities of a fracture for the range of labor
requirements observed in the data, and highlights the similarity between the
two sets of results. For the probit regressions, the length of war service is held
at its sample mean of 2.5 years, while for the duration model the figure plots
the probabilities that the survival time is less than 2.5 years. Predictions are pro-
duced separately for ships produced before and after the mandatory design
changes of May 1943. For ships whose keels were laid before May 1943 the ob-
served reduction in direct labor requirements, from 1.25 million hours to
350,000 hours, increased the probability of a fracture from zero to almost one
third. The design changes mandated in the spring of 1943 significantly reduced
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Figure 2. Predicted Fracture Probabilities at Calshiprequirements (350,000 hours), the design changes reduced the probability of
fractures from one third to about 0.1.
5. Time-to-Build Delays
Planners at the USMC typically thought in terms of 'rounds of the ways'.
The first ship produced on a particular way belongs to the first round, the sec-
ond ship to the second round, and so on. In each yard, construction on the first
round of Liberty ships began while the yard itself was still being built. Because
prefabrication buildings and cranes were often not installed, a large proportion
of the production of first- and second-round ships took place on the ways. The
result was that the earliest ships in each yard spent longer on the ways, they
were produced using more labor-intensive techniques than were ships produced
after the yard was completed, and labor productivity was lower. 
There are no direct data on how long it took to construct a new yard, nor
on how many ships were affected, but both were clearly substantial. In August
1942, for example, Vickery testified to congress that "it had been our experience
from the yards we had put in that it takes about a year to put a yard in and get
really producing" (House of Representatives, 1942, p.251). If this was generally
true, productivity on the first nineteen ships produced at Calship may have
been adversely affected by time-to-build delays. 
Similarly, there are no direct data on the extent to which productivity was
affected. However, construction progress reports for South Portland Shipbuild-
ing Corporation
30 provide some illustration. The yard laid its first Liberty ship
keel on 24 September 1941, yet on 7 January 1942 only five of seven cranes in
the construction plans had been delivered and only three of these were
operational. Four ships were being constructed at the time, and two of them
were being constructed largely from manual welding.
31 Clearly, the technology
30 After a management change, the yard subsequently changed its name to the New
England Shipbuilding Corporation.
31 The information is contained in attachments to Allen (1942), who commented in a
- 20 -of production was different for the first round of the ways, and it would be
wrong to attribute to learning by doing the productivity increases observed as
yards progressed from the first to the second round. In fact, Lane (1951, p.232)
simply notes that the first round of ships "was often built while the yard was
still under construction" and disregards them in making his productivity
comparisons. 
There are no new data for Calship that might allow us to measure time-to-
build delays. Hence, it will be necessary in the next section to follow Lane and
disregard productivity data for some of the earliest ships produced. Figure 1
provides some insight as to where that cutoff should be made. Labor productiv-
ity on successive keels was abnormally volatile until the twenty-first keel was
laid on 29 January 1942, from which date productivity on new ships began to
rise more or less monotonically. It seems reasonable to infer that until late in
January 1942 some ways had only restricted access to the prefabrication facili-
ties, while other ways had normal access. This conclusion finds further circum-
stantial support from the sudden drop in production time after the twenty-first
keel had been laid. The twentieth keel was laid on 14 January 1942 and was de-
livered 157 days later. The twenty-first keel was laid just two weeks later, but
was made ready for delivery in only 119 days. The decline in production time
was the largest in absolute terms between successive keel layings and, at over 24
percent, was also by far the largest proportional decline. In the next section, we
will therefore attribute the gain in productivity observed between the first and
twenty-first ships (a period of approximately one year) to time-to-build delays,
and eliminate the first score of ships from subsequent analysis.
letter to Vickery that "we are preassembling our material in sections as much as is
possible. However, due to the fact that much of our preassembly area is either
unserviced by cranes or is unavailable due to incompleted facilities, we are limited to a
great extent in performing this work."
- 21 -6. Sources of Productivity Growth at Calship
This section concludes the paper with a decomposition of productivity
growth at Calship among the various sources discussed in previous sections. To
do so, it is necessary to transform capital authorizations into utilized capital
stock estimates, and to transform fracture probabilities into labor hour equiva-
lents. Direct evidence to facilitate these tasks is scarce, and we will have to rely
on some creative guesswork.
The construction of a capital services series involves two adjustments to the
raw data on capital authorizations. First, time-to-build delays will make the ac-
tual capital stock smoother than is indicated by capital authorizations. I assume
that physical investment begins ten days after an authorization, and the creation
of productive capital proceeds at a constant rate equal to $1 million dollars of
new infrastructure per month.
32 Second, to adjust for variations in capacity
utilization, I assume that capacity utilization is 100 percent when the yard oper-
ates on a seven-day, three-shift production schedule. Monthly data on shift and
weekend employment are then used to provide an estimate for monthly capac-
ity utilization rates, under the additional assumption that employment in each
month on the first shift on weekdays represented capacity at that time.
33 
The following assumptions are used to transform fracture probabilities into
labor hour equivalents. I assume that the cost of a class I fracture is the loss of
two months (out of an average of 2.5 years) of ship service time, plus 150,000
labor hours in repair. A class II fracture is assumed to cost the loss of one
month of service time and 50,000 labor hours of repair.
34 In both cases, the
32 These figures are a little more conservative than the time-to-build delays suggested
from the evidence on yard construction.
33 When ship production declined late in the war, employment was reduced first by
ending weekend work, and then second and third weekday shifts, before reducing
employment on the first shift.
34 From Lane's (1951) descriptions of the damage caused by fractures, these numbers
seem moderate. However, the contribution of quality change to productivity growth
turns out to be quite small, and the results of the growth accounting excercise reported
below are not sensitive to wide variations in these numbers.
- 22 -labor cost of lost service for a fractured ship is calculated using the labor hours
required in the production of that ship. Labor productivity can then be adjusted
for quality by weighting the labor cost of each type fracture according to the
shares of class I and II fractures in Calship's 63 fractures, and multiplying the
weighted sum by the predicted probability of a fracture appropriate for a vessel
with the indicated labor requirement. The probabilities are taken from the pro-
bit regression. 
  The following log-linear specification is modeled: 
(2) , lnqi = b0 + b1lnki + b2lnLi + ui
where qi is total labor hours expended on ship i, adjusted for quality; ki is the
capital stock available when the keel of the ith ship was laid, adjusted for capac-
ity utilization; Li is total employment hours during the month in which keel i
was laid; and ui is a disturbance. Equation (2) can, of course, be derived from a
Cobb-Douglas production function; the expected signs of the coefficients are
b0>0, b1<0, and b2>0.
Measurement errors in quality and in the capacity-adjusted capital stock
may cause serious problems for consistent estimation of (2). Valid instruments
for quality are not available, and so the dependent variable has been adjusted for
quality directly. Neither ki nor Li were used in the probit and Weibull regres-
sions, and it is reasonable to conclude that measurement error in qi is uncorre-
lated with the regressors in (2). Any measurement error in quality will show up
in the disturbance term and possibly in a biased constant term. This will have
an effect only on the correct measurement of the contribution of changes in
quality to measured productivity growth. Fortunately, valid instruments for
the capital stock are available. It has already been observed that yards which
had produced more ships and had more experience were more likely to receive
additional capital. Hence, calendar time and cumulative production will be cor-
related with the unobserved true capital stock, but not with the measurement
errors introduced by the time-to-build delays that have been assumed.
- 23 -The results of the regression analysis are in Table 4. As discussed earlier, all
productivity growth in the first twenty ships is attributed to time-to-build de-
lays in yard construction, and the sample excludes these ships. Column (1) re-
ports OLS estimates, while column (2) reports the parameter estimates from
instrumental variable (IV) estimation. The coefficients are all significant and
have the expected sign. Constant returns to scale require that the sum of the co-
efficients on capital and labor sum to zero, which is easily rejected. In fact, re-
turns to scale are estimated to be close to two.
35 A one percent increase in
capital at the Calship yard reduced labor hours per ship by an average of 1.6
percent, while a one percent increase in employment increased labor hours per
ship by an average of 0.6 percent.
Note in both cases, however, the presence of significant serial correlation.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for stationarity strongly indicate that q, k, and
L are all I(0), and hence the low Durbin-Watson statistics are assumed not to be
a sign of a spurious regression. Column (3) thus reports the results of IV estima-
tion with a correction for first-order serial correlation in the residuals. The re-
siduals are stationary, but the high autocorrelation coefficient does give warning
that shocks to productivity that are omitted from equation (2) have effects that
decay rather slowly.
The parameter estimates from column (3) were used to account for the
sources of productivity growth at Calship. Figure 3 plots the results of  decom-
posing productivity growth into the cumulative contributions of: 1) time-to-
build delays in yard construction; 2) quality changes; 3) changes in the capital
stock; 4) changes in employment; and 5) an unexplained residual.
Estimating the contribution of time-to-build delays in yard construction is
straightforward given the assumption that productivity growth for the first
twenty ships is entirely attributable to this source. As Figure 3 indicates, time-
to-build delays account for a 45 percent reduction in hours per ship during the
first year. Thereafter, of course, its contribution is constant.
35 For an equivalent specification to (2), Rapping (1965) had estimated returns to
scale of about 1.75.
- 24 -Table 4.  Estimates of Productivity Equation
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG OF QUALITY-ADJUSTED LABOR HOURS PER SHIP, lnqi
(1) (2) (3)`
OLS IV IV-AR1
CONSTANT   2.819
(.15)
  3.745  
(.12)










  0.488  
(.06)
  0.611  
(.29)















Standard errrors in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) have robust standard errors.
Columns (2) and (3) use the logarithms of cumulative output and the date of keel laying
as instruments for the capital stock. Column (3) adjusts for first-order serial correlation
using Cochrane-Orcutt; r is the estimated coefficient on the lagged disturbance.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for stationarity yield test statistics of -5.23 for lnqi -5.02
for lnki, and -6.86 for lnLi. The 1 percent critical value is -3.51, and the unit root is
easily rejected in all three cases. 
The estimated contribution of quality changes, in contrast, is rather small.
As the probability that a ship develops fractures rises, so does the discrepancy
between observed and quality-adjusted labor requirements. However, the ex-
pected cost of fractures is never greater than 3 percent of the initial labor re-
quirements. After the mandatory design changes that were introduced in spring
1943, about the time that hull number 180 was laid, the cumulative contribu-
tion of quality change suddenly drops, to less than 0.5 percent of the observed
- 25 -productivity growth. This estimate is, of course, dependent on the assumptions
made about the cost of fractures. Nonetheless, it is clear that no plausible cost
estimates will change the conclusion that the contribution of quality changes
was, despite the dramatic nature of the fracture incidents, rather small.
As one might expect, the largest contributors to productivity growth are the
increases in the capital stock, aided by increases in capacity utilization for the
first hundred ships, and partially offset by increases in yard employment. By
the end of the Liberty ship construction program, capital investment had ac-
counted for a 70 percent reduction in labor requirements, employment in-
creases had caused a 30 percent increase in labor hours, while the terminal
contribution of capacity utilization was zero.
Finally, Figure 3 also plots the unexplained contributions. On average,
about 5 percent of the observed reductions in labor requirements remain unex-
plained. At worst, the growth decompositions leave only 10 percent unex-














































































Figure 3. Sources of Productivity Growth at Calshipevident, and may result from omitted productivity shocks that have fairly slow
decay rates. 
36  Nonetheless, the magnitude of any omitted shocks appears to be
rather small. Above all, the growth accounting exercise has left no room for
learning by doing.
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